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A SHORT INTRODUCTION IN BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS
People are faced with numerous decisions every day. Whether we must choose our outfit for the
day, which cell phone brand to buy, what college to attend, to buy a car or house insurance,
or even when or to whom to get married, decisions are a permanent presence in our daily
activities. Behavioral economics is a multi-disciplinary field of study investigating how people
make judgments and decisions (Camerer and Loewenstein, 2004; Heilman, 2014). Even though,
from a historic point of view, behavioral economics is considered to be a relatively young field
of research, the large number of studies that were undertaken and their theoretical and practical
implications havemade the field of behavioral economics increasingly visible among scholars. More
importantly, they have also facilitated contexts to transform behavioral results into social policy
programs. Starting in 2010, the UK government launched the Behavioral Insights Team, also known
as The Nudge Unit, which was then followed by the Social and Behavioral Sciences Team (SBST),
established by the Obama administration in 2014. Both teams aim to apply behavioral sciences,
including behavioral economics, in governmental programs in order to increase people’s quality of
life at lower costs. The efforts of the Nudge Unit and the SBST or other agencies and individual
researchers who are trying to improve people’s overall quality of life should be supported by the
research community through relevant scientific projects and by constantly finding new ways to
capitalize research derived knowledge for the general use of a community.
THE ULTIMATUM GAME
A large proportion of behavioral economics studies rely on various economic games, which have
the advantage to depict a decisional situation in a simplified form. The Ultimatum Game (UG,
Güth et al., 1982) is a decision-making task that illustrates a negotiation scenario. The standard
UG involves two players. The first player, also known as the proposer, has the task of dividing a
certain amount of money with a second player, called the responder. The responder can choose
to accept or reject the received offer. Should the responder accept the offer, the money is divided
between the two players per the proposer’s offer. However, if the responder decides to reject the
offer, then neither player gets any money. Most frequently, when participating in an UG task, both
players are informed regarding the rules of the game, the amount of money that is to be shared
and the consequences of their possible actions (Güth and Kocher, 2014). Based on two economic
assumptions, namely participants’ rationality and their interest in maximizing their gain (Camerer
and Fehr, 2006), the normative solution for the UGwould be for the proposer to send theminimum
possible amount to the responder. For the responder, it would be expected to accept any non-zero
amount. Nevertheless, both players behave in a significantly different manner compared to the
normative behavior. More specifically, it was found that most proposers offer a larger proportion of
the pie to share, approximately 50% of the total amount. Also, responders’ behavior deviates from
normative expectations because lower offers, of 20% or less of the total amount, are rejected by
most participants (Camerer, 2003).
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The UG triggers two conflicting reasons that could guide
players’ behavior. On one hand, normative decisional theories
would argue that decision-makers are rational and self-interested,
motivated to maximize their gain. Although some people, in
certain specific situations, behave rational in the UG, most
of the times proposers and responders seem to be guided
by some other motive than self-maximization. Judgements of
fairness and intentions behind the money allocation decisions
are frequently invoked (Loewenstein et al., 1989). There is
converging behavioral and neuroimaging data that indicates that
people engage in fairness judgements (Brosnan, 2011), due to
a concern for reciprocity (Rabin, 1993), or inequity aversion
(Fehr and Schmidt, 1999; Tricomi et al., 2010). Therefore, studies
suggest people might have an innate sense of fairness that guides
their behavior in social interactions and division of a benefit.
Based on the behavioral results obtained playing the UG,
the task has established itself as one of the most powerful
tools that highlight the limitations of the normative models
of decision-making. Since it was first introduced, the UG has
been played in hundreds of experimental studies, with numerous
methodological variations (Güth and Kocher, 2014).
Many scholars have advanced different theories in their efforts
to explain the behavioral pattern in the UG and why the
economic normative predictions are violated. Their endeavor
opened the possibility to investigate many variables, including
methodological modifications, individual differences or even
cultural background. A thorough presentation of all these
variables is beyond the scope of this paper (for further reading
on this topic, see Güth and Kocher, 2014). However, of particular
interest for the research community and directly related to this
topic are studies that have associated gender differences (Eckel
and Grossman, 2001; Solnick, 2001) with decisions related to
how much money to send to the responder or when an offer is
accepted or rejected.
In spite of the fact that there are many experimental studies
related to the UG and how people allocate resources among
them, the game’s applicability in more ecological environments
is less well-investigated. Carpenter et al. (2005) show that there
are no significant behavioral differences between UG allocation
of college students compared to workers, providing empirical
evidence for the external validity of the UG. However, scholars
speculate that decision-makers’ preferences in the UGmight also
reflect behavioral differences in real life situations, such as salary
negotiations, but direct evidence is missing.
THE GENDER PAY GAP
There is an increasing number of studies that show the existence
of a gender pay gap, providing systematic proof that, on average,
men are paid more than women (Ge et al., 2015; Joshi et al.,
2015; Webber and Canché, 2015). It has been estimated that
women are paid 23% less compared to their male colleagues, and
the pay gap might be even higher for Afro-Americans or Latino
minorities (Joshi et al., 2015). Even looking at people pursuing
doctoral studies in different domains (Webber and Canché, 2015)
or people working in the fast-developing field of IT (Ge et al.,
2015) there is a significant salary difference favoring men. Studies
show that some of these differences might be due to the fact that
women avoid salary negotiations (Eckel et al., 2008; Leibbrandt
and List, 2014), or to gender related stereotypes (Reuben et al.,
2014; Fabre et al., 2016).
The decisional situation depicted by the UG could be used
to test and investigate the factors that contribute to the fact that
women are offered less and accept lower salaries than men, while
keeping constant the education and professional training levels,
total number of working hours during a week or similar job
requirements. In a nutshell, the decision to accept a job for a
certain salary is similar to the responder’s decision in the UG to
accept an offer.
CAN BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS PROVIDE
USEFUL INSIGHTS AND RESEARCH
TOOLS TO REDUCE THE GENDER PAY
GAP?
UG studies have looked at gender differences in offers that are
made and accepted/rejected. Most studies indicate that women
are offered less compared to men and also that women have
higher acceptance rates, including for unfair offers (Solnick and
Schweitzer, 1999; Eckel and Grossman, 2001; Solnick, 2001; Eckel
et al., 2008). So far, we can only speculate that UG behavior
could be related to real life salary decisions. Future studies should
take upon the challenge to directly test if there is an association
between the two decisional contexts and to what extent UG
results could be informative outside the laboratory setting. If
systematic research could prove an association between people’s
behavior in the UG and real life decisional behavior, such as salary
negotiation, scholars could connect the two investigative topics
with mutual scientific benefits. That is, individual differences
that have been associated with decisions in the UG might be
investigated if they could also account for the fact that women
are offered lower salaries and they usually accept lower payments
than men. Various social policies or organizational practices
regarding salary allocations for men and women could profit
from this scientific cross-fertilization in order to remedy a
current discriminating situation.
Until present date, the field of behavioral economics has
produced an impressive number of studies regarding our
decision-making. Moreover, behavioral economics is already
trying to provide useful data that can create or help implement
a large variety of social programs designed to increase
quality of life. Building on past success, new studies should
be designed to further bridge the gap between theory and
practice.
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